Ruth Ann Jefferies v. Wilbur R. Jefferies: Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
Ruth Ann Jefferies v. Wilbur R. Jefferies: Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark W. Sessions; Jay W. Butler; Campbell, Maack and Sessions; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant.
David S. Dolowitz; Cohne, Rappaport and Segal, P.C.; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Ruth Ann Jefferies v. Wilbur R. Jefferies, No. 940373 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6021
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
RUTH ANN JEFFERIES, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILBUR R. JEFFERIES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
inv.H courr OF APPEALS 
i r r 
DC 
K h -j 
50 
.A10 Q^ iQ^T-^ 
DOCKET NO ' w ' ' ' 
Trial Court No. 924701612DA 
Appeal Court No. 930373-CA 
/ 
Priority No. 15 
-oooOooo— 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED MAY 25, 1994, IN THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY, HONORABLE RODNEY 
S. PAGE, CIVIL NO. 924701612DA. 
Clark W. Sessions (2914) 
Jay W. Butler (0526) 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0005 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Utah Court of Appeals 
DEC 1 4 1994 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
RUTH ANN JEFFERIES, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
) Trial Court No. 924701612DA 
WILBUR R. JEFFERIES, ) Appeal Court No. 930373-CA 




APPEAL FROM FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED MAY 25, 1994, IN THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY, HONORABLE RODNEY 
S. PAGE, CIVIL NO. 924701612DA. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0005 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Clark W. Sessions (2914) 
Jay W. Butler (0526) 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, 13th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i i i , i v 
JURISDICTION 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 2,3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, . 3 
FACTS RELEVANT TO FIRST ISSUE 4 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES . . . 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 6 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DIVIDED 
ALL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS 8 
POINT II 
APPELLANT PRESENTED NEITHER HIS 
ARGUMENT THAT THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE 
JOINED AS NECESSARY PARTIES OR THAT 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR FRAUD HAD 
NOT BEEN MET TO THE TRIAL COURT AND 
NEITHER ARGUMENT SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL 14 
i 
POINT III 
THE CHILDREN ARE NOT NECESSARY 
PARTIES FOR PROPER RESOLUTION OF 
THIS MATTER 15 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE 
APPELLANT IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTED TO 
REMOVE PROPERTY FROM THE MARITAL 
ESTATE AND ORDERED PART OF IT 
RETURNED AND AWARDED TO THE 
APPELLEE 16 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 21 
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 21 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 22 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 23 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 24 
ADDENDUM 25 
Trial Court's Ruling of December 15, 1993 
Trial Court's Ruling of February 18, 1994 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Decree of Divorce 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES: 
26 U.S.C. § 401 (a) 4 
26 U.S.C. § 457 4 
42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1) (D) 2,10 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 0 2-8 20 
Utah Code Ann. §3 0-3-5(1) 2 
Utah Code Ann, §§ 75-5a-101-123 21 
Utah Code Am § 78 2a 3 ( 2) ( i ) . . 1 
B. CASES: 
Auble v. Auble, 866 P.2d 1239 (Or. App. 1 99 3 > • 21 
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Rurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah App. 1994) 
Bain v ,. Bali 1, 558 So . 2d 2 3 8 9 ( F I a A} p • 5 L i s t 1 99 0 > 
Buder v. Sartoref 744 P.2d 13 88 (Co, 1989) 
Burt v. Burtf 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 1990) 
Coates \ Coates, 626 N, E.2d 7 07 (Oh io Cow. Pi. 1993) 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 813, 819-20 
(Utah App. 1992) 
Dorltv v. Dorityf 645 P.2d 56 ( Utah 2 982) 
Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 13 66, 1370 
(Utah App. 1993) 
Encflert v. Encrlert, 576 P. 2d 12 74 (Utah 1978 ) 
• . English v. English, 879 P.2d, 802, 8 07-808 
(N.M. App. 1994* 
















Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d at 965 18 
In re: Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E. 2d 1314 
(111. App. 4 Dist. 1993) 19 
Jefferies v., Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988) 16 
Jimenez v. Lee, 547 P.2d 126 (Or. 1976) 15 
Ohline Cory, v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 
(Utah App. 1993) 16 
Ravpleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993) 22 
16 
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991) 12 
Schnabel v. Superior Court (Schnabel), 21 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 200 (Cal. 1993) 20 
Schneeman v. Schneeman, 615 A.2d 1369 
(Pa. Super. 1992) 11,13 
Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 247 
(Utah App. 1993) 2,20 
Webb v. Webb, 431 S.E.2d 55 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) 20 
While v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994) 2 
White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994) 20 
Witbart v. Witbart, 702 P.2d 339, 341 (Mt. 1985) 20 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) 9,10 
iv 
W i l l ANN ,ILI-PERIE:.i, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILBUR R. JEFFERIES, 
uYAH COURT OF 
STATE OF UTAH 
— - 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — 
rial Court No. 924701612DA 





This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the provisions 
7R ?*••!(? )(\) ol the Utah Code and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it included Appellant's retirement 
I hi . in |II11|II 11v ill IIii" nii-irilal estate? 
This Court will affirm the division of marital assets in a divorce proceeding absent 
decision, this Court will "presume the 
correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates 
a clear abuse of. . . discretion.'" Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 819-20 (Utah App. 
1992) (citations omitted). 
2. Where Appellant failed to object either to a finding of fraud by the trial court 
or to argue that the children of the parties were necessary additional parties for the 
resolution of the issue of Appellant's dissipation of marital assets, has Appellant waived 
this Court's consideration of those issues? 
"Because [Appellant] did not raise th[ese] matter[s] before the trial court, we do 
not address [them] for the first time on appeal." Crockett, 836 P.2d at 821. 
Additionally, this Court will affirm the decision of the trial court on any proper 
ground. White v. Deseelhorst. 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994); Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc. 
v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1994); Embassy Group. Inc. v. Hatch. 865 P.2d 
1366, 1370 (Utah App. 1993); Slatterv v. Covey & Co.. Inc.. 857 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION ARE 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO 
THE APPEAL. 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1) (1994) provides: 
When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts 
or obligations, and parties. 
42 U.S.C. 402(c)(1)(D) which provides: 
"(1) The husband (as defined in section 216(f) [42 USCS § 
416(f)]) and every divorced husband (as defined in section 
216(d) [42 USCS § 416(d)]) of an individual entitled to old-




(D) is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance 
benefits, or is entitled to old-age or disability insurance 
benefits based on a primary insurance amount which is less 
than one-half of the primary insurance amount of such 
individual, shall (subject to subsection(s)), be entitled to a 
husband's insurance benefit for each month, beginning with -
(i) in the case of a husband or divorced husband (as 
so defined) of an individual who is entitled to an old-age 
insurance benefit, if such husband or divorced husband has 
attained retirement age (as defined in section 216(1) [42 
USCS § 416(1)]), the first month in which he meets the 
criteria specified in subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D), or 
(ii) in the case of a husband or divorced husband (as 
so defined) of -
(I) an individual entitled to old-age insurance 
benefits, if such husband or divorced husband has not 
attained retirement age (as defined in section 216(1) [42 
USCS §416(1)]), or 
(II) an individual entitled to disability insurance 
benefits, the first month throughout which he is such a 
husband or divorced husband and meets the criteria specified 
in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) (if in such month he meets 
the criterion specified in subparagraph (A)),..." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court granted the parties a divorce after the parties had been married 
more than 20 years. On May 25, 1994, the trial court entered a final Decree of Divorce 
with supporting Findings. The Decree and Findings were entered on May 26, 1994. See 
Addenda MA" and "B". Appellant did not file any post-trial motions objecting to the 
Decree or the Findings of the trial court. 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
The parties, residents of Davis County at the time of the filing of this action, were 
3 
married November 10, 1973 (Finding of Fact paragraph 2, R.1106.) Two children were 
born as issue of the marriage (paragraph 4, R. 1106). The trial court acting through 
Judge Rodney S. Page awarded each of the parties a Decree of Divorce from the other 
on grounds of irreconcilable differences. (R. 1129). 
FACTS RELEVANT TO FIRST ISSUE. 
Appellant is the Executive Director of the Wasatch Front Regional Council, an 
inter-governmental agency. He has been serving as its Executive Director since 1976 
and employed by the Wasatch Front Regional Council since 1972 (Defendant's Exhibit 
34, R. 73-74, 753 - 754). As an employee of the Wasatch Front Regional Council, he 
participated in two retirement programs, a plan implemented pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
§ 401(a) and a plan implemented pursuant to Title 26 U.S.C. § 457. (R.659-660, 672. 
Exhibits 11D, 14D, 15D, 16D and 17D.) The Wasatch Front Regional Council offered 
and administrated these plans in lieu of participation in the Federal Social Security 
system. (Defendant's Exhibits 14D, 15D, and 16D). By virtue of this election, Appellant 
does not have any claim to Federal Social Security benefits as a result of his 
employment though he does have such a claim as Appellee's former spouse. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 402(c)(1)(D) (R. 661, 1159). 
Contributions are made to the 457 Plan directly from Appellant's salary and are 
not subject to tax until they are removed from that Plan. (R. 606-607, 659-660, 672.) 
Unlike Social Security, the funds in the 457 Plan belong to the Appellant and can be 
withdrawn without penalty if he leaves his employment, is disabled or retires regardless 
of his age. (R.672.) The Wasatch Front Regional Council takes the percentage that it 
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would normally pay as the employer's contribution to the Social Security Plan and places 
that in the 401 Plan as a contribution on behalf of the Appellant. (R. 667.) While the 
401 Plan could be divided between the parties, the Section 457 Plan cannot be divided 
by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. (R. 672-673.) 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES. 
During the marriage the Appellant made gifts to the parties' children totaling 
$145,725.00 by depositing that amount in accounts established in their names at Dean 
Witter Reynolds and Shearson Lehman pursuant to the Utah Uniform Gift to Minor's Act, 
(R. 631-632, 1033-1036, 999, 1048, 1055-1056, Exhibits 29D, 30D, 31D, 32D, 34D and 
23P). After examining the records of these transactions, in particular Defendant's Exhibit 
46 and Plaintiffs Exhibit 23, the trial court determined that most of these sums were 
deposited between 1991 through 1993. (R.397, 1077.) This was after the parties had 
started having serious marital problems and had gone to counseling in an attempt to 
resolve those problems. (R.26, 755-756.) Appellant made regular deposits in these 
accounts but in no year did they exceed $10,000.00 per child and thus no gift tax returns 
were filed. (R.1048.) 
Appellee did not know these accounts existed (R.741). Appellant had set up the 
accounts with the children (R. 1042-1043) and while the Appellee had discussed early in 
the marriage putting money away for the children, she never knew how large the 
amounts were or that the accounts existed (R. 741, 1035). Appellee never saw 
statements from either the Shearson Lehman or the Dean Witter Reynolds accounts 
(R.1056). Appellant had the statements delivered to a post office box (Exhibits 29D, 
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30D, 31D, 32D, 46D and 23P, (R. 1036). Additionally, Appellee never saw the children's 
tax returns (R.741, 1036) as the Appellant had the children sign their own tax returns (R. 
1036) and never discussed the accounts, or returns, with Appellant (R.631-632). 
Appellee learned about these accounts which totalled $145,725.00 only through 
discovery during the course of the divorce, (R. 632). Generally, Appellant did not 
discuss financial matters with the Appellee (R.719) and Appellee did not agree that the 
$145,725.00 belonged to the children (R. 736). 
The trial court found in regard to these accounts: 
It's obvious to the court, however, that those amounts were 
deposited without the knowledge of the Plaintiff and without 
her consent. Further evidence of that, all statements were 
sent to a separate Post Office box which was maintained 
solely by the Defendant. 
The court finds that those sums came from assets and 
monies which were acquired during the marriage and were 
marital assets, and the diversion of those funds to accounts 
in the Defendant's name and the children's names was in fact 
a fraud upon the Plaintiff and upon the marital estate, and 
therefore finds that any transfer made under the Uniform 
Gifts to Minors Act to those two accounts on behalf of the 
children are void and those sums are brought back into the 
marital estate. 
(R. 397, 1077-78.) Appellant never objected to these Findings after they were 
announced from the bench or by filing any type of post-trial motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly divided the retirement benefits accumulated by the 
Appellant between the parties during their marriage. The funds in the 457 account were 
withheld from the pay of the Appellant. Had they not been withheld, they would have 
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been received as marital income and used by the parties. The 401 account was 
accumulated by Appellant's employer on his behalf. Both accounts are marital assets 
required to be divided between the parties in their divorce by Utah Law. The trial court 
properly exercised its discretion in finding that both accounts were marital property and 
divided them as part of the marital estate. In addition, Appellant is eligible for Social 
Security benefits by reason of Appellee's participation in Social Security in a marriage 
exceeding 10 years. 
Appellant argues in this appeal that the minor children should have been made 
parties to the action and that taking their property is a denial of due process of law. This 
argument was never made to the trial court either at trial or post-trial. Accordingly, 
Appellant has waived this Court's consideration of these issues. However, even if the 
Court considers the waived issues, the trial court properly determined that Appellant 
defrauded the marital estate by removing these assets and that this property should be 
brought back into the marital estate and divided. 
If Appellant violated any of his duties to the children under the Uniform Gift to 
Minors Act, he alone stands responsible to the children for those actions and he can 
make up their losses. However, Appellant's breach of his fiduciary duty to the children 
is not before the Court and does not impact upon his duty to the marital estate. 
On appeal, Appellant argues that fraud was not shown by clear and convincing 
evidence. However, this was not presented to the trial court and this Court should refuse 
to consider it for the first time on appeal. Even if this Court does consider whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support a finding of fraud, the evidence was clear and 
7 
convincing that the Appellant defrauded Appellee and the marital estate. Moreover, even 
if this Court were to determine that Appellant has not waived this issue and that there 
was insufficient evidence to support the finding that removal of marital property from the 
marital estate and placing it in the names of the children is fraud, the Court could still 
affirm the trial court's ruling on the ground that Appellant's actions were a dissipation of 




THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DIVIDED ALL 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS. 
This Court will affirm the division of marital assets in a divorce proceeding absent 
an abuse of discretion. In reviewing that decision, this Court will "presume the 
correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or inequity that indicates 
a clear abuse of. . . discretion.'" Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819-20 (Utah App. 
1992) (citations omitted). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, but rather 
properly divided the retirement assets of the parties. 
The retirement funds accumulated by Appellant in his 457 Plan were taken directly 
from his pay. (R. 659-660, 672). The funds accumulated in Appellant's 401 Plan were 
contributed by his employer in an amount that would have been contributed by the 
employer had Appellant been in the Social Security system. (R.667.) The funds in the 
457 Plan are Appellant's and the at the time he leaves his employment, is disabled or 
retires, he receives them without penalty regardless of his age (R.672). It was clearly 
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established at trial that: (1) the funds accumulated in Appellant's retirement accounts 
were contributed during the marriage; (2) the funds were from his compensation; and, 
(3) the funds were accumulated on his behalf (Exhibit 11D, 15D, 16D, and 17D). The 
trial court correctly found that these funds were marital assets and divided them between 
the parties as part of the marital estate. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Enqlert v. Enqlert. 576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978) 
rejected the claim by a husband that money accumulated in a Veteran's Administration 
Hospital Retirement Plan should not have been included and divided as part of the 
marital estate. The Court declared: 
It is our opinion that the correct view under our law is that 
this encompasses al] of the assets of every nature possessed 
by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source 
derived; and that this includes any such pension fund, or 
insurance. 
k l at 1276 (emphasis added). 
Four years later, the Utah Supreme Court rendered its decision in Woodward v. 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) in which the husband claimed that his retirement 
benefits should not have been divided as part of the marital estate. The Court ruled in 
part: 
This argument fails to recognize that pension or retirement 
benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the 
employer. If the right to those benefits are acquired during 
the marriage, then the court must at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distribution of the marital 
assets. "The right to receive monies in the future is 
unquestionably... an economic resource" subject to equitable 
distribution based upon property computation of its present 
dollar value. 
9 
l± at 432. 
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, but rather correctly applied Utah 
law in including the retirement benefits Appellant accumulated during the course of the 
marriage and dividing in the property division. Appellant even concedes that this result 
is required by the decision of this Court in Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App. 
1990). In Burt this Court held, "[retirement benefits accrued during marriage must 
normally be 'considered a marital asset subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.'" 
Id, at 1170 (citation omitted). However, Appellant then asserts that this ruling is in error. 
Such an assertion in insupportable. This court in Burt was applying § 30-3-5(1) of the 
Utah Code as mandated by the Utah Supreme Court in Englert and Woodward. 
Despite this clear line of precedent from the Utah Supreme Court and this Court, 
Appellant asserts that because his retirement benefits were accumulated in lieu of Social 
Security and he will not obtain Social Security through his own account, his retirement 
benefits should have been excluded from the marital estate. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in rejecting this argument. Appellant incorrectly asserts he will not 
receive Social Security benefits. Appellant and Appellee were married for more than 10 
years. Under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(D), the Social Security Act, 
Appellant will qualify for benefits as the divorced spouse of Appellee. Though he does 
not qualify for social security from his own earnings, he will be eligible for benefits based 
upon the Social Security Act as beneficiary of the Appellee's payment of social security 
taxes during the course of the marriage. 
Appellee agrees that Social Security benefits are not subject to the law of 
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the State of Utah. They are governed by the Social Security Act itself. Appellee agrees, 
however, that does not effect this case both because the Appellant is eligible for benefits 
from Appellee and because the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion in dividing 
Appellant's retirement plan as part of the equitable division of the marital estate. 
This issue was recently addressed by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico, a 
community property state, which ruled that a trial court erred in considering the wife's 
social security benefits and reversed the trial court where it had used her benefits to 
effect an equal distribution of the community property. English v. English. 879 P.2d, 802, 
807-808 (N.M. App. 1994) cert denied 880 P.2d 867 (N.M. 1994). 
Application of that rationale to this case would make irrelevant that the Appellant 
does not qualify for social security benefits on his own account as the 457 Plan was 
created by contributions from his salary and the 401 Plan contributions built up in his 
behalf by his employer during the marriage. This deferred compensation should be 
divided between the parties without taking into account the social security benefits as the 
courts of New Mexico did in English, supra. 
Appellant cites to this court Schneeman v. Schneeman, 615 A.2d 1369 (Pa. 
Super. 1992) as support for his position. However, that case does stand for the 
proposition asserted by Appellant. There the Superior Court of Pennsylvania declared 
"also exempt from marital property is the part of a pension which is in lieu of social 
security." kL at 1375. There are two reasons why the trial court in the instant case 
appropriately rejected this authority. The first is that Utah law is not as Pennsylvania law 
is declared to be in the quote set forth above. Utah law includes all assets of every kind 
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in the marital estate for equitable division. The second basis is that in Schneeman 
there was no indication that Mrs. Schneeman was a participant in Social Security which 
would allow Mr. Schneeman to receive benefits as a divorced spouse who had been 
married for ten years. 
Appellant also cites Coates v. Coates, 626 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio Com. PL 1993). 
However, that ruling is not quite as clear as Appellant presents it. There is an extensive 
discussion of the issue of whether or not the present value of social security should be 
excluded from a marital estate where one spouse participates in a civil service retirement 
and is not covered by social security, but the specific ruling of the court was the Motion 
for Declaratory Judgement was denied as "a portion of Plaintiffs Civil Service Pension 
should not be exempted from the marital estate to the extent that it is in lieu of social 
security benefits." ]<± at 707 (emphasis added). The court in Coates indicated this is 
not a summary question, but should be examined more carefully. The general rule of 
Ohio that it is more appropriate to consider the present value of the actual social security 
benefits of the spouse of the exempt party, rather than the present value of hypothetical 
social security benefits of the exempt party, i d at 708. In this regard, Utah law is 
clearly different from Ohio if the focus is on the benefits to actually be paid. 
This Court ruled in Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App. 1991) that 
Social Security benefits are not to be considered until they are actually received. 
Applying that principle to this case, the trial court's ruling is correct and the issue of who 
receives what from Social Security and other retirement benefits is appropriate for 
consideration not in regard to the division of the marital estate, but rather the income 
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actually received by the parties bears on the alimony issue, an issue not appealed by 
the Appellant. \± Just as this Court has indicated that the division of assets is a fact 
sensitive issue which should be decided on each case, so did the Ohio Court of 
Common Pleas in Coates declare that it would be inequitable to apply a Social Security 
set off in all cases and circumstances and no general rule was articulated by that 
decision. In fact, the court concluded by noting that the present value of social security 
could be used as a factor, but it could also be rejected as a factor by a court exercising 
its equitable discretion in dividing a marital estate. 626 N.E.2d at 708. 
Again, as in Schneeman there was no consideration of the fact that the civil 
service retirement recipient might have benefits for Social Security benefits because of 
the other spouse, a factor present in the instant case. 
The third case presented by Appellant is that of Bain v. Bain, 553 So.2d 1389 
(Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1990). Examination of this opinion reveals the primary focus of the 
decision was the error of the trial court in failing to equitably divide the marital estate by 
failing to exclude from the division the premarital contributions to a retirement pension 
and contributions made after the original Decree of Dissolution. While this case did 
involve considering one spouse earning social security and the other earning a pension 
of lieu of social security, no consideration was given to the fact that the spouse of the 
social security participant was eligible for benefits because of the duration of the 
marriage. While the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Florida considered the different 
types of retirement plans, no hard and fast rule was articulated. In the instant matter, 
the trial court followed the mandates of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, 
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considered all assets and divided them appropriately and within its sound discretion. 
If there is any question remaining, it is what will be the income of the parties at 
the time of their retirements if there is still an alimony obligation by Appellant to 
Appellee. At that time, this court has directed consideration of the issue based not on 
an asset value, but on the income actually received, Rudman, supra. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by following the precedent of the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court by equitably dividing the parties' retirement benefits. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT PRESENTED NEITHER HIS ARGUMENT 
THAT THE CHILDREN SHOULD BE JOINED AS 
NECESSARY PARTIES OR THAT THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF FOR FRAUD HAD NOT BEEN MET TO THE TRIAL 
COURT AND NEITHER ARGUMENT SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
In this appeal, Appellant argues two issues that were never raised in the trial 
court. By not allowing the trial court the opportunity to rule on these issues, Appellant 
has waived this Court's consideration of those issues. As this court declared in Crockett 
v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992), "[w]e are governed by the general 
principle that matters not placed in issue at the trial, cannot be considered for the first 
time on appeal." Since Appellant did not present to the District Court the argument that 
the children were necessary parties to this action or the argument that the fraudulent 
actions of the Appellant were not established by clear and convincing evidence, those 
arguments may not be raised for the first time in appeal. 
Despite this waiver, and in an abundance of caution, Appellee will address these 
two points separately and demonstrate that the trial court's decisions were correct or 
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supportable under applicable Utah law. 
POINT III 
THE CHILDREN ARE NOT NECESSARY PARTIES FOR 
PROPER RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER. 
Appellant claims that affirming the trial court requires the joinder of the 
minor children of the parties to whom he has given gifts from the marital estate. That 
is not true. Whether Appellant defrauded Appellee or the marital estate or dissipated 
marital assets, the trial court can appropriately direct Appellant who still has control over 
these assets to return them (at least Appellee's one-half) to the marital estate as they 
are under his control and he is under the jurisdiction of the court. CI Doritv v. Doritv, 
645 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). If the Appellant breaches his responsibilities to the children 
by compliance with this Order, he may be liable to them for violating his fiduciary duties, 
but he is and can be responsible out of his separate estate. 
There is no question that Appellant, if he has given property to the minor children 
of the parties under the Uniform Gift to Minors Act, owes them the responsibility of a 
fiduciary in caring for their property. Buder v. Sartore, 744 P.2d 1383 (Co. 1989), 
Jimenez v. Lee, 547 P.2d 126 (Or. 1976). This is a separate responsibility from that he 
owed to Appellee, that is not to defraud her on the marital estate and not to dissipate 
marital assets. If Appellant has violated duties to both Appellee and the children, he 
must face each separately. He must bear the consequences himself as he created the 
situation when he fraudulently removed or dissipated marital funds and placed them into 
accounts in the children's names. If the children thereafter seek to hold him responsible 
when the District Court appropriately orders Appellee's share of these funds returned to 
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the marital estate for distribution, he has a separate obligation to the children. They 
need not be joined to this action for that to take place. 
However, as between Appellant and Appellee, a complete resolution can be 
reached without the joinder of the children. Appellant can leave "his" one-half of the 
$145,725.00 with the children if he chooses to do so. Their claims against Appellant, 
if any, should be resolved separate and apart from Appellee's claims. The trial court 
could not make a property award to the children of the marital property, Jefferies v. 
Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988), and Appellant cannot produce this result 
unilaterally. The trial court appropriately prevented this from occurring. If Appellant feels 
this is unjust to the children, he is free to make good his "gifts" from his own property. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE APPELLANT 
IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTED TO REMOVE PROPERTY FROM THE 
MARITAL ESTATE AND ORDERED PART OF IT RETURNED AND 
AWARDED TO THE APPELLEE. 
Appellant asserts for the first time on appeal, that there is insufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's determination that he defrauded the marital estate. Appellee 
recognizes that it is normally Appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in support of 
a trial court's finding and then demonstrate why that evidence is insufficient to support 
that finding. Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). 
However, a short reiteration of the facts before the trial court demonstrates there was 
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sufficient to support the finding of fraud.1 
The evidence heard by the Trial Court demonstrated that Appellant placed 
$145,725.00 of marital funds in accounts in the children's names under his control the 
children had no jobs or source of money that would let them accumulate this fund (R. 
631). Once these accounts were opened, Appellee never saw the statements sent by 
the brokers (R. 1056). Appellee did not give the funds, ($145,725.00), to the children 
(R. 631). There was no discussion between the Appellant and Appellee regarding these 
accounts. (R.631). Appellee was not aware of these accounts (R.631-632) and learned 
about them only through the divorce discovery (R.632). Appellee testified that Appellant 
did not discuss financial matters with her (R. 719) and she did not know that any money 
had been set aside for the children's education (R.735, 741). Appellee did not see the 
children's tax returns which included evidence of the "education funds" until they were 
produced in response to her discovery requests (R. 731). The account records were not 
transmitted to the house, they were transmitted to a post office box (Box 770) (see 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23, and Defendant's Exhibits 29, 30, 31, 32, and 46). The children 
signed their own tax returns (R.1036). The record is clear that the accounts were set 
up by Appellant with the children (R. 1042-1043) and no gift tax was filed to reflect the 
gifts being given to the children. (R.1048.) In sum, Appellant removed $145,725.00 
from the marital estate without the knowledge of or consent of Appellee and gave these 
1Again, Appellee's demonstration of the sufficiency of the evidence is in an 
abundance of caution. Appellant waived this Court's consideration of this issue by failing 
to file any post-trial motions which would have allowed the trial court to rule on this 
issue. 
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funds to the children under his control under the Utah Gift to Minors Act. 
The only evidence that existed contrary to the finding of the court is that Appellee 
did discuss with the Appellant early in the marriage putting money into accounts for the 
children. However, she went on to say that she never knew they were in the large 
amounts discovery determined (R.1055) and while Appellant said he discussed these 
with Appellee, she testified that they did not. (R.631.) 
The evidence outlined above is sufficient to support the finding of fraud made by 
the trial court. The veracity of a witness is for the fact finder to determine. Here the trial 
court determined that the evidence demonstrated that Appellant defrauded the Appellee 
and the marital estate. 
Appellant asserts that the evidence of his fraud is not clear and convincing and 
requests reversal of the decision. By declaring that Appellant had defrauded Appellee 
and the marital estate, the court implied a finding that the evidence of Appellant's fraud 
was clear and convincing, Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d at 965, and simply failed to record that 
specific finding. The evidence as marshalled by Appellant fails to demonstrate an error 
in this determination. 
Additional evidence before the court indicated that Appellant perceived there had 
been severe marital problems for four years before the divorce was filed (R.26). He 
testified that there had been stress in the family for a number of years (R.755-56). He 
placed most of the $145,725.00 in the children's accounts during these "stress" years 
and put $8,000.00 into the children's accounts after he had separated from the Appellee 
and was involved in his relationship with another woman (R.1038) (Exhibits 23P and 
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46D). This evidence not only supports the finding of the court, it is not in the evidence 
"marshalled" by Appellant. 
This case is similar to that of In re: Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E. 2d 1314 (III. App. 
4 Dist. 1993) where several years prior to the divorce action being filed, the husband 
began transferring annual $10,000.00 gifts to Totten Trusts for each of the children, then 
when the parties were discussing separation, he used $81,404.00 to purchase bonds for 
his minor daughter, then a few months later, $45,315.00 for his son. Two weeks before 
the parties separated, he transferred an additional $20,000.00 to each Totten Trust. 
Then on the day of separation, he transferred an additional $100,000.00 into an 
irrevocable trust for the benefit of the children. The trial court found that the husband 
had dissipated marital assets in making these transfers. The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the Trial Court's compensating the wife for this dissipation by the husband. As the Court 
of Appeals noted, if it permitted a finding of non-dissipation of assets simply because 
they were transferred out of the marital estate and to the parties' children, it invited a 
vindictive spouse to make transfers for the purpose of depriving the other spouse of the 
use of his/her share of the marital estate which is particularly inequitable when the 
earning power of the two spouses are substantially different. JdL at 1320-1321.2 
While the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court based on dissipation 
as opposed to fraud, the same actions can lead to the same result and give this court 
an alternative ground for affirming the trial court even if it were to find that evidence of 
2ln this case, Appellant earns three times what Appellee is able to earn and while the 
total sums were less, the actions of Appellant were similar to those of Dr. Lee. 
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a clear and convincing nature did not exist. White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 
(Utah 1994), Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1994) 
Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1370 (Utah App. 1993), Slatterv v. Covev 
& Co., Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah App. 1993). 
An additional ground for affirmance is based on the relationship between Appellant 
and Appellee. If Appellant made transfers to the children purportedly on behalf of the 
Appellee, then he would have been doing so pursuant to § 30-2-8 of the Utah Code 
wherein he would be acting as her attorney (agent) in disposing of property for their 
mutual benefit. As such he would be a fiduciary and owe to her the responsibilities of 
a fiduciary. If, as the fiduciary, he did not disclose in full the actions he has taken, he 
would have breached his fiduciary duty and be liable to Appellee Witbart v. Witbart, 701 
P.2d 339, 341 (Mt. 1985) (failure to disclose debts). Cf. Webb v. Webb. 431 S.E.2d 55 
(Va. Ct. App. 1993) (failure to disclose information). 
On this question the decision of the California Supreme Court in Schnabel v. 
Superior Court (Schnabel), 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (Cal. 1993) is particularly instructive. 
The California Supreme Court ruled that each spouse has a fiduciary to the other in 
managing community property and that duty includes the obligation to make full 
disclosure of all material facts and information regarding the existence, character and 
valuation of all assets. The evidence is certainly clear and convincing in this case, that 
information was not only not given to Appellee by Appellant, it was hidden from her. If 
that forms another basis for affirmation of the ruling of the trial court by this Court, it 
should do so if that is necessary. 
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A similar ruling is that of the Court of Appeals in Oregon in Auble v. Auble. 866 
P.2d 1239 (Or. App. 1993) where the court ruled in Oregon there is fiduciary 
responsibility between husband and wife imposed because of the confidential 
relationship between them and it continues until they act to dissolve their marriage. kL 
at 1243-44. Application of that principle to this case demonstrates Appellant breaching 
his fiduciary duty to Appellee in transferring property out of the marital estate though 
under his control. U.C.A. §§ 75-5a-101 -123. 
The trial court found that the Appellant defrauded the Plaintiff and the marital 
estate. The trial court made that determination without making a determination as to the 
fiduciary responsibility of Appellant to Appellee or on the dissipation of the marital estate. 
The trial court did so simply on the basis of the evidence before the court. That 
evidence, when properly marshalled supports his determination. It is also a 
determination which can be upheld on the alternate grounds that Appellant breached his 
fiduciary duty to Appellee and/or dissipated marital assets. On any or all of these 
grounds, this Court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
Appellee was found by the trial court to be in need of assistance, in paying her 
attorney's fees, which Appellant could provide. She was awarded $8,750.00 to assist 
her in payment of those fees. (R.1125, 1135.) She is in need of assistance in paying 
the attorney's fees and costs which she has incurred in defending this appeal and those 
should be awarded to her. Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), Rappleve v. 
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Rappleve. 855 P.2d 260 (Utah App. 1993). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court appropriately divided the marital assets of the parties by including 
and dividing the retirement accounts. The argument of the Appellant is that because he 
does not qualify for social security his retirement account should not have been included 
in the marital estate and divided. This was appropriately rejected by the trial court. It 
is the law of Utah that all marital assets are to be included and divided by the trial court, 
including all retirement accounts. 
In addition, the argument of the Appellant that he has no social security benefits 
ignores the fact that he qualifies for social security benefits by having been married to 
the Appellee for more than ten (10) years and she is a participant in Social Security. 
Appellant waived this Court's consideration of his issues II and III by failing to 
present them to the trial court. This Court should refuse to consider the merits of those 
issues. However, even if this Court addresses those issues, the trial court appropriately 
ordered the return of $145,725.00 to the marital estate and properly awarded half of that 
fund which Appellant sought to remove from the marital estate to Appellee. The 
Appellant claims that the children should be joined before this property is returned. That 
is not necessary. There is jurisdiction over Appellant and he could be ordered to return 
the money and divide it with Appellant pursuant to the court's Decree. If that puts 
Appellant in violation of fiduciary duties to the children under the Utah Gift to Minors Act, 
then that is a separate matter he must resolve with the children. He created that 
problem. Appellee would not be involved in that proceeding and Appellant should be left 
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to deal with the problems he may have created without Appellee. In addition, he is free 
to leave his one-half of the $145,725.00 to the children if he chooses to do so and can 
make i jp the balance from his property if that is his desire. What he cannot do is give 
Appellee's property to the children or force Appellee to fight with the children as he urges 
this Hi mi I In i li '| 111ini ,n in!eve 
The evidence of Appellant's fraud on the marital estate and Appellee is clear and 
in in1" I'll i in1 iMH'i I  Mi'iiii li nihil', in IIPIIH" mini M I (hi" I in in ,11 I'fuiii 'ih nli| |IH ,*ilfii i men I i HI the aitfii iale 
grounds of dissipation of marital assets or bread i of fiduciary 
the return to the marital estate of the $145,725.00, or at least that halt c1 t -vnic^ - a* 
been awarded to t! le A ppellee. 
The Appellee being forced to defend this appeal should be awarded the costs and 
attorney's fees she has incurred in having to do so. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellee seeks the affirmation of the ruling of the trial court dividing the retirement 
accoi ints accumulated by the parties during their marriage, the award to her one-half of 
the $145,725.00 Appellant improperly sought to remove from the marital estate and an 
award e attorney's fees and costs she has incun ed on appeal. 
Dated this Jf day of December,, 1nn4. 
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THE COURT: I better make that right. The 
plaintiff is to pay any ordinary office — excuse me, she 
doesn't have the custody. The defendant is to pay that, the 
ordinary office calls and those types of things. 
MR. PARKER: I wasn't clear on who you said was 
to keep the insurance. 
THE COURT: He is to keep — do they presently 
both have it? 
MR. PARKER: They both do. 
MRS. JEFFERIES: I would be most happy to carry 
the children on my policy. 
THE COURT: You both should carry them. I think 
that is the most beneficial thing at their age. The 
defendant still has the obligation to pay — let's get this 
right. The defendant does have the obligation to pay any 
noncovered, just ordinary out-of-pocket expenses as far as 
office calls and those kinds of things, and the parties will 
share noncovered expenses, one-third to the plaintiff and 
two-thirds to the defendant. 
The Court will make the following ruling relative 
to the monies which are presently being held in the accounts 
at Shearson Lehman and the accounts at Dean Witter Reynolds 
in the names of the children. 
The Court finds that in looking at the records, 
that a total of $20,448 has been paid to Nicole from the 
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business from 1988 through 1992; that there have been a 
total of approximately $22,664 deposited in that Shearson 
Lehman account over that same period. In fact, that 
includes up through '93 — excuse me, the income amounts do 
not include '93. 
The Court would find that Lon over that same 
period has been paid $20,453, and that $23,396 has been 
paid, deposited in that account at Shearson Lehman during 
that same period. 
The Court notes that $15,000 was withdrawn from 
Nicole's account by Mr. Jefferies, supposedly in conjunction 
with her in the purchase of the condominium and whatever 
happened to that, I don't know. After that point, apparently 
he's testified that there was some borrowing done and that 
was repaid, but I don't know where that ever shows up. That 
is between him and Nicole. 
The Court would find that a $7,000 amount was 
withdrawn from Lon's account in 1991 and a bond was 
purchased at Dean Witter Reynolds. The Court would find that 
those sums which were deposited in the Shearson Lehman 
account in fact constitutes the majority of the earnings 
which the children have had during that period of time and 
there may be some other incidental amounts which have been 
deposited. 
The Court therefore finds that those amounts 
which remain in the Shearson Lehman accounts belong to the 
children. In addition to that, the bond which can be traced 
from the $7,000 withdrawal from Lon's account is also awarded 
to Lon as his separate property. 
The Court would find that substantial other monies 
were deposited in accounts at Dean Witter Reynolds in the 
names of Mr. Jefferies and the children, supposedly under the 
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act. The Court would find that those 
sums were primarily deposited from the records that I have 
from '91 through '93. I don't know the sources. It's just 
about impossible to determine from the information supplied by 
the parties- It's obvious to the Court, however, that those 
amounts were deposited without the knowledge of the plaintiff 
and without her consent. Further evidence of that, all 
statements were sent to a separate P.O. box which was 
maintained solely by the defendant. 
The Court finds that those sums came from assets 
and monies which were acquired during the marriage and were 
marital assets, and that the diversion of those funds to 
accounts in the defendant's name and the children's names was 
in fact a fraud upon the plaintiff and upon the marital 
estate, and therefore finds that any transfer made under the 
Uniform Gifts to Minors Act to those two accounts on behalf 
of the children are void and those sums are brought back 
into the marital estate. How I wi11 disburse those funds, I 
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don't know, but I make that ruling as far as those funds are 
concerned and I will make disposition of them as I proceed 
with the other property questions that I have reserved. The 
other matters, I will make written findings and conclusions 
on. 
Are there any questions that you have on what 
I've ruled at this point, Mr. Dolowitz? 
MR. DOLOWITZ: None, your Honor. The only 
question I have is, do you want — the question is whether 
you want partial findings prepared or just wait until there 
is a complete — 
THE COURT: I want you to wait until I send you 
the final ruling. Then you can put it all together. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: Then I have no questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parker? 
MR. PARKER: I have no questions. I didn't hear 
when you were dealing with support, what you found the 
plaintiff's income to be. 
THE COURT: I found the plaintiff's income to be 
$2246 per month gross. I believe that's consistent with what 
was on your affidavit. 
MR. PARKER: I just didn't quite hear it. 
THE COURT: You found the father's income to be 
$6,123. I found it to be $6,000. The difference being that 
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I thought the testimony was that his income from his regular 
employment was $72,000 a year. Is it different than that? 
MR, PARKER: I don't remember what it was 
exactly. 
THE COURT: The testimony was it was $72,000 as 
testified to by Ms. McGuire, and I divided that by 12 and 
that's how I came up with the $6,000 per month. 
The Court then will take the matter under 
advisement and I will try to rule on that within the next 10 
days so you have that before the end of the year. 
Anything else to come before the Court, 
Mr. Dolowitz? 
MR. DOLOWITZ: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Parker? 
MR. PARKER: No. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. I would just 
commend you for the manner in which the case was presented, 
given all of the things we had to do and you did a good job 
of presenting it and I appreciate it. The Court's in 
recess. 
Counsel, I'm not sure I was clear on it, but the 
Shearson Lehman accounts are to go to the children. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: We have that, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL^ DISTRICT 
BY__ y//5 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH ANN JEFFERIES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILBUR R. JEFFERIES, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 9247 01612 
This matter having come on regularly for trial before the Court, the plaintiff being 
present and represented by Mr. Sandy Dolowitz and the defendant being present and 
represented by Mr. Rodney Parker. The Court having heard the evidence of the parties and 
the arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of the 
trial and reserved for further ruling the issues of property division, alimony and related 
matters. The Court having now considered these matters and being fully advised in the 
premises rules as follows: 
That these parties were married on November 10, 1973. Both of the parties had 
worked previously and acquired property prior to the marriage in the form of savings. The 
plaintiff brought $17,000.00 or $18,000.00 into the marriage and these funds were used to 
purchase furniture, fixtures and to provide for other family expenses. 
Approximately one month prior to the marriage, the defendant purchased a home for 
$39,200.00. He put $17,000.00 of premarital funds in as a down payment. The title to the 
property was in defendant's name alone. The parties resided in the home until June 1, 1974, 
when they purchased a home on Elaine Drive in Bountiful. The prior home remained in the 
name of the defendant and the mortgage payments and up keep were paid forth from marital 
assets. In 1981, the home was sold for $100,420.00 to "Dones". As part of the purchase 
price the buyers conveyed two lots to the defendant worth $62,000.00 and paid some 
$18,000.00 cash. The buyers also assumed a mortgage of approximately $18,000.00. 
The two lots were conveyed to the defendant in his name and were lot 28 and lot 52 
of Quail Brook valued at $24,000.00 and $38,000.00 respectively. 
Pursuant to an agreement, defendant sold lot 28 back to "Dones" on June 3, 1982, for 
the sum of $20,300.00 and subsequently sold lot 52 for $29,000.00 on March 3, 1988, to 
one Dubach on terms of $15,000.00 down and the balance of $14,000.00 together with 
interest within one year. 
There is no evidence as to what happened with the proceeds from the sale of the 
home in 1981 or from the sale of the two respective lots. There is no evidence that the 
funds went into any separate accounts or were traceable to certain assets so as to maintain 
their separate identity. 
The plaintiff prior to her marriage to the defendant, received a gift of certain stock 
from her uncle. That stock has remained in tact and in her name. The parties have done 
nothing with that as a marital asset. 
The parties now own two homes which they have purchased during the marriage. 
One is known as the Elaine Drive home and was the former family home and the other is the 
home on Bountiful Boulevard and was the family home at the time this action was filed. The 
defendant and the children voluntarily moved from the family home before this matter was 
filed. The plaintiff has continued to reside in the home on Bountiful Boulevard and the 
defendant and the two children reside in the home on Elaine Drive. 
The children continue to attend the schools that they attended previously. 
The home on Bountiful Boulevard is the larger of the two homes. 
The home on Bountiful Boulevard has an appraised value of $225,000.00. There is a 
mortgage balance of approximately $61,394.00 leaving an equity thereon of approximately 
$163,606.00. 
The home on Elaine Drive was appraised at $113,000.00. There is a mortgage 
balance of approximately $36,880.00 leaving an equity therein of $76,120.00. 
Each of the parties have vehicles. The plaintiff has a 1987 Subaru Wagon vamea at 
$4,100.00. The defendant has a 1986 Olds Toronado valued at $2,900.00 after deducting a 
sum required to repair certain body damage. Defendant also has a 1991 Subaru Sedan 
valued at $600.00. 
The parties have an airplane which they own as part of a business known as Flying 
Start. The parties have agreed that the plane has a value of $55,453.00. They have also 
agreed that the plane should be awarded to the plaintiff subject to an obligation on it of 
$15,135.00, leaving a net value on the plane of approximately $40,318.00. There is also a 
spare airplane engine worth approximately $200.00 as parts. 
During the course of the marriage the defendant has been part of a group that has 
invested in real estate. In so doing, he has acquired a one-third interest in 9.69 acres in Salt 
Lake County; and 8.25% interest in an approximately 26 acres in Salt Lake County; and a 
one-forth interest in certain property known as the Jordan Heights property also in Salt Lake 
County. 
The value of the 9.69 acres is $68,900.00. The defendant's interest amounts to 
$22,966.00; the value of the 26 acres in which defendant has an 8.25% interest is 
$50,200.00. The defendant's interest is worth $4,141.00; and the value of the Jordan 
Heights Partnership property is $103,400.00. The defendant's one-forth interests is worth 
$25,850.00. 
The Court finds that the defendant borrowed some $32,000.00 from the "Oswald" 
Profit Sharing Plan to repay certain credit lines in connection with the video business and the 
Flying Start Company in 1992. To secure the payment of those sums the defendant gave a 
trust deed note secured by the 9.69 acres and pledged his interest in the Jordan Heights 
Partnership. The note was amortized over 9 years and remains in the balance of 
approximately $2,800.00 owing. If you deduct the balance owing on the note from 
defendant's interest in the 9.69 acres and his interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership 
property that leaves a net value on those two properties of approximately $20,816.00. 
The Court finds that defendant's partners in these land ventures appear to be 
accommodating, allowing him to use the same to secure loans and appear to have the same 
investment and ownership goals as defendant. Therefore, the Court does not discount the 
value of these properties because of defendant's minority interests therein. Further, the 
Court finds that these values were established by evaluation for property tax purposes. The 
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that traditionally these values are at least ten percent 
below the fair market value. The Court finds that any difference in value caused by 
defendant's minority interest is more than offset by the actual value to these properties. 
The defendant has purchased a condominium since separation. The Court finds that 
the defendant has approximately $5,000.00 equity in the condominium. 
At the time of separation the parties had a savings account at First Security with a 
balance of approximately $10,995.00. The plaintiff has used that account for her benefit 
during that period. 
The plaintiff also has a 40IK in her name in a value of approximately $12,716.00. 
During the marriage, approximately $145,725.00 was placed in accounts at Dean 
Whitter Reynolds in the children's names pursuant to the Uniform Gift to Minors Act. The 
Court has previously ruled that these deposits were done by defendant without knowledge of 
the plaintiff and constitute fraud upon the plaintiff and upon the marital estate. It is ruled 
that these gifts are void and these monies are made a part of the marital estate. 
While the parties were married savings accounts have been set in the children's names 
at Shearson-Lehman. These accounts have been funded primarily from earnings of the 
children while working in the family business and from various gifts they have received. 
From these funds a $7,000.00 bond was also purchased for Lon. The defendant has 
borrowed certain funds from Nicole's account to put down on the condominium he 
purchased. 
The defendant has various life insurance policies on his life which have accumulated a 
cash value. Beneficial Life Policy has a cash value of $3,399.00; Penn Life has a cash value 
of $700.00; and Principal Mutual has a cash value of $659.00. 
The plaintiff has a life insurance policy with Beneficial Life with a cash value of 
approximately $775.00. 
There are also life insurance policies in the children's names with accumulated cash 
values. 
The plaintiff has been employed by the Utah State Tax Commission for the past 
several years and she has acquired a minimum retirement in the State Retirement System. 
She has income of approximately $2,246.00 per month. She also has income of 
approximately $300.00 per month that she receives from the rental of a room in the home. 
The defendant is employed by Wasatch Front Regional Counsel and has a salary of 
approximately $72,000.00 annually. That provides a gross income of approximately 
$6,000.00 per month. 
The Wasatch Front Regional Counsel has opted out of the social security system so 
that they have a separate retirement system for their employees. The system provides for 
retirement by allowing employees to invest in a 457 plan which is administered by the State 
of Utah. In addition, the Wasatch Front Regional Counsel contributes a matching amount 
into a separate plan known as a 401a which is administered by Principal Financial. 
The plan provides many advantages over social security. Under the 457 plan, all 
funds accumulated are paid over to the employee upon termination of employment, death, 
disability or unforeseeable severe financial emergencies. The recipient, upon retirement, can 
elect a lump sum distribution, periodic payment or certain other alternatives. 
Under the 401a plan, the employer makes a contribution on behalf of the employee. 
However, the employee can also make voluntary contributions. The contributions made by 
the employer are totally vested upon death, retirement or termination. The employee has 
several options for pay out including lump sum. 
Under this plan, any contributions made by the employee may be withdrawn at any 
time but withdrawal before to age of 59 1/2 may be subject to a 10% penalty by the IRS. 
Under either of the plans, all amounts in the accounts may be passed to a beneficiary 
upon proper designation. 
The defendant presently has $233,412.00 in his 457 plan and $222,800.00 in his 401a 
plan. All sums were accumulated during the marriage. 
Plaintiff has minimal State Retirement, having drawn out some $30,800.00 in January 
of 1981 to apply towards the purchase of their home. 
Plaintiff has some social security eligibility. 
In 1986, the parties opened a business known as "The Video Palace". Over the years 
the children have worked in the business and the earnings therefrom were the primary 
sources of the children's savings accounts at Shearson-Lehman. 
The business has been operating for 7 years and has provided income to the parties. 
The assets of the business in addition to the actual videos themselves, consist of certain 
computer equipment, a 1983 Dodge Van and a hot air balloon. 
Various experts were called to evaluate the business. These estimates range from a 
low of $30,000.00 to $35,000.00 to a high of $169,000.00. 
The method of depreciation was a critical factor in evaluation as it has a profound 
effect on cash flow for evaluation purposes. Too rapid a depreciation rate tends to under 
estimate cash flow and too slow a rate tends to over estimate it. For obvious reasons, 
plaintiff's experts opted for the slowest depreciation rate and defendant's for the fastest. The 
Court would find that the most reasonable depreciation rate would be the one near the faster 
rate allowed by the IRS regulations. 
The Court further finds that the fair market value established by defendant's expert of 
$30,000.00 does not fairly take into consideration the history of the business and its 
performance over time and is more a liquidation sale price than the sale price of the going 
concern. From the evidence, the Court finds that the fair market value of the business is 
approximately $100,000.00. There is owing on the business an obligation in the amount of 
$35,000.00 to First Security Bank. The Court therefore finds that the net value of the 
business is approximately $65,000.00. 
The Court further finds that in addition to monies paid to the children family expenses 
have been paid from the business and that family expenses for other household supplies, 
food, transportation and entertainment have been subsidized by the business. 
The Court does not consider the transaction between The Video Palace and Ms. Stein 
in 1993 to have been an arms length transaction. Therefore, the Court has not considered 
that for evaluation purposes. 
The Court finds that each of the parties has in their possession certain furniture and 
fixtures. The Court is unable, based upon the evidence, to place a value on these items. 
The Court does find that the parlor grand piano in the plaintiffs possession was 
purchased with funds given to her by her parents for that purpose and constitutes a gift from 
them. It is not part of the marital estate. The Court further finds that during the course of 
the marriage the defendant has acquired certain tools, equipment, personal property and 
certain firearms. 
The Court finds that the parties have incurred debts during the course of the marriage 
a mortgage on each of the two homes, a balance owing on the business, a balance owing to 
the Oswalds Profit Sharing Plan, the obligation owing on the airplane in the business known 
as Flying Start, taxes owing on the Bountiful Boulevard home, the debts the defendant has 
incurred since separation to Zions on the piano and a car purchased for Nicole. 
The Court finds that neither of these parties will be able to maintain the same 
standard of living that was available while they were residing together. The Court finds that 
the plaintiff's requested expenses were unreasonable regarding the amount that she claimed 
for tuition when the Court sees no real advantage to additional education, for entertainment 
expenses in excess of $100.00 per month, for children's expenses in the amount of $200.00 
per month in light of her obligation to pay child support and for vacation expenses of 
$150.00 per month. Taking that into consideration the Court finds that the plaintiff has 
reasonable expenses of approximately $2,724.00 per month. 
The Court finds that the expenses claimed by the defendant are unreasonable in that 
food expense for the three people in excess of $400.00 per month is excessive particularly in 
light of the Court's finding that the cost of food, household supply, transportation and 
entertainment expenses are subsidized to some extent by the business as valid business 
expenses. The Court finds that clothing expense in excess of $100.00 is also unreasonable as 
is a dental and medical expense of $150.00 per month for where each of the parties carry 
insurance. Entertain expenses in excess of $100.00 is also unreasonable given the manner in 
which business expenses are handled. The Court further finds that the obligation on Nicole's 
car is a voluntary obligation incurred by the defendant after separation. That any sum for 
Nicole's car in excess of $175.00 is excessive given the circumstances of these parties. The 
Court further finds that the deduction of $400.00 per month for a new car for the defendant 
is also excessive given the circumstances of the parties. The Court further excludes the 
payment to Zions Bank for the piano which was purchased after the date of separation for 
that reasons the Court considers it frivolous. The Court further finds that a claim of $150.00 
for allowance for the children is unreasonable in light of their history of employment with 
the business. For reasons which will become clear further in the opinion, mortgage payment 
claimed by the defendant is excessive to the sum of $483.00. Based upon the forgoing the 
Court finds that a reasonable expenses for the defendant approximate $4,000.00 per month. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff has a net income of $1,588.00 per month, plus 
$300.00 rental from the rental of a room in the home and that she should receive 
approximately $300.00 per month interest income from funds awarded to her. That she is 
without sufficient funds to meet her reasonable expenses. 
The Court finds that defendant has income $6,000.00 per month with net income of 
between $4,500.00 and $4,700.00 per month not including monies which he is able to 
receive from the business or the money that he saves by subsidizing family obligations 
through business expenses. In addition, he will have child support from the plaintiff in the 
sum of approximately $300.00 per month. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees of approximately 
$30,000.00 based on 319 hours having been contributed by two attorneys and two paralegals. 
Mrs. Jefferies did much of the computations as to the graphs and business expenses offered 
in evidence by the plaintiff. 
Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of $20,653.00 based upon total hours of 165 
attributed by counsel and co-counsel. 
The Court finds that this case was not extremely complicated. It did have certain 
novel issues as to retirement and the usual factual issues involving a family business and its 
value. However, the Court finds that to have spent 319 hours on this particular case is 
unreasonable. 
The Court finds that given the complexity of the case, the nature of the issues and the 
results obtained that 150 hours is a reasonable amount of time to spend on this case by 
attorneys who are as knowledgeable in the area of domestic relations as these two attorneys 
are. A reasonable attorney's fee would be $125.00 per hour. 
From the foregoing findings of facts the Court concludes as follows: 
That the plaintiff should be awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard subject to the 
mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,606.00 for the reason that the 
plaintiff is presently living in the home and defendant voluntarily removed himself therefrom. 
Given the disparity of the income between the parties, it is highly unlikely that plaintiff could 
purchase such a home on her own. Further, by allocating this equity to the plaintiff, it 
allows the defendant to retain a greater portion of his retirement. 
The home of the parties on Elaine Drive should be awarded to the defendant subject 
to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately $76,120.00 for the 
reason that is where the defendant and the children have been residing since the separation. 
It appears to meet their needs. Given the defendant's income, he has the capacity to move 
up if he so desire. 
The plaintiff should be awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of $4,100.00. The 
defendant should be awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of $2,900.00. The 
plaintiff should be awarded the airplane subject to the indebtedness thereon in the amount of 
$15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00 and the defendant the spare airplane engine. 
The defendant should be awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and the one forth 
interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the amount of 
$29,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those two parcels of 
$20,816.00. The defendant is further awarded the 8.25 percent interest in the 26 acres with 
a net equity of $4,141.00. The defendant should be awarded the condominium purchased 
subsequent to the separation which has an equity of $5,000.00. 
The plaintiff should be awarded the savings account at First Security Bank in its 
original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit of that account 
during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those sums to pay her expenses 
during that period. 
The plaintiff should be awarded the 401(K) in the amount of $12,716.00. Each of the 
parties should be awarded half of the sums in the Dean Whitter Reynolds account in the 
amount of $145,725.00. Any income taxes incurred as a result of this withdrawal is to be 
born equally by the parties. 
The plaintiff should be awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash value of 
$775.00. 
The defendant should be awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a cash value of 
$3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his Principal Mutual policy 
with a cash value of $659.00. 
The defendant should be awarded The Video Palace together with the furniture and 
fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness thereon of 
$35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00. 
The Court finds that the retirement program of the defendant in the form of a 457 
plan and a 401a are plan substantially different from social security in both the rate of return 
and the ownership interest which the defendant has in the plans. That ownership interest 
allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among other things allows him to 
withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may choose upon retirement, death 
or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries. All of these benefits are substantially 
more favorable than the usual social security benefits. For that reason, the Court does not 
accord to these retirement benefits the same protection as is required the federal law for 
social security. Therefore, the Court concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital 
property and subject to division in this proceeding. 
The defendant should be awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the amount of 
$233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff should be awarded $201,000.00 of the 401(a) plan free and clear of any 
claim of the defendant. The defendant should be award $21,800.00 from the 40K$ plan free 
and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. 
The Court concludes that the total value of the property previously awarded should be 
approximately equal. 
Each of the parties should be awarded those items of personal property presently in 
their possession together with any furniture and fixtures. The Court finds that they are 
essentially equal. 
Each of the parties should be awarded his or her own personal property and 
possessions. 
The defendant should be awarded his tools, power equipment and sporting goods 
including firearms free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. 
The Court orders that the tools and equipment used for yard care and maintenance are 
to be divided equally between the parties. As an exception to the Court's ruling above, the 
Court orders that defendant return to the plaintiff the electric garage door opener, hose 
attachments to the vacuum, one of the computers, a CD player and in the event that there is 
more than one Sega and Nintendo player, one is to be returned to the plaintiff. 
The parties are ordered to divide equally any family photographs which they may 
have acquired during the course of their marriage. 
The Court considers those items of furniture and fixtures used by the children to be 
the property of the children. 
The Court considers that the $17,000.00 initially contributed by the plaintiff to the 
marriage and the $17,000.00 initially invested in the home purchased by the defendant to 
have become marital property. The funds have been co-mingled and as such have lost their 
identity as separate premarital property. Therefore, the Court considers them as marital 
property in the allocation made between the parties herein. The Court further finds that 
stock given to the plaintiff by her uncle which has remained in her name has not been co-
mingled and is her sole and separate property and not subject to distribution. 
The sums in the children's names at Shearson-Lehman and Lon's bond are awarded to 
the children. 
The plaintiff should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt due and owing on 
the home on Bountiful Boulevard including any taxes and on the airplane is awarded to her 
and to hold the defendant harmless thereon. 
The defendant should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt and obligation due 
on the home on Elaine Drive, the obligation due and owing on the business, the balance of 
any sums owing on the airplane in excess of $15,135.00, the balance due and owing to the 
Oswald Profit Sharing plan and any other debts or obligations incurred during the course of 
the marriage or which he has incurred subsequent to the day of separation. The defendant is 
to hold the plaintiff harmless thereon. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff is in need of additional support to meet her monthly 
expenses. Although, the Court finds that the plaintiff will receive certain interest payments 
from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional support in order to meet her 
monthly expenses. 
The Court concludes that in light of the defendant's income from the Wasatch Front 
Regional Counsel, his other investments, child support he will be receiving and the benefits 
incident to the ownership of the business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the 
plaintiff by way of support. The Court therefore concludes that the defendant should be 
ordered to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $700.00 per month as and for alimony. 
The Court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this matter would be 
$18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the result. The Court 
concludes that the plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said attorney's fees but is without 
sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial invasion of the marital estate given 
her income. The Court finds that the defendant, given his superior earning ability, has the 
ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he does so in the amount of $8,750.00. 
The plaintiffs counsel is to prepare findings of fact, conclusion of law and judgment 
in accordance with the Court's ruling and submit the same to Mr. Parker at least ten days 
prior to the time it is submitted to the Court for signature. 
Dated this lg>^ day of February, 1994. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
•fcb 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling, on the 
day of February, 1994, postage prepaid to the following: 
David Dolowitz 
525 East First South 
Fifth Floor 
P.OBox 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Rodney Parker 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Peggy BoumkL Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo— 
RUTH ANN JEFFERIES, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. ) Civil No. 924701612DA 
WILBUR R. JEFFERIES, ) Judge: Rodney S. Page 
Defendant. ) 
—oooOOOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the court, the Honorable Rodney 
S. Page presiding for trial on the 9th and 10th day of December, 1993, with the closing 
argument on December 15, 1993. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by 
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The Defendant was present in person represented by 
counsel Rodney R. Parker. The court after hearing the evidence of the parties and the 
arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of trial 
and reserved for further ruling the issues of property division, alimony and related 
matters. Having considered those matters and being fully advised in the premises, the 
court issued its ruling on the 18th day of February, 1994. Accordingly, the court makes 
and enters the following as its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Plaintiff was a resident of Davis County, State of Utah the date 
this action was filed and had been so for more than three (3) months immediately prior 
thereto. 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been married November 
10, 1973. 
3. Irreconcilable differences arose between the parties which made 
continuation of their marriage relationship impossible. 
4. Two children were born as issue of this marriage, Nicole L. Jefferies, 
born on January 7, 1977, and Lon Mark Jefferies, born May 7, 1980. Pursuant to the 
stipulation of the parties, care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties 
should be awarded to the Defendant subject to reasonable visitation as that is defined 
in Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35. Provided, however, the relationship between the 
children and Plaintiff is strained. For that reason, visitation is something that will have 
to be worked out between Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that 
the children may not be willing to go to stay over night, the court orders visitation every 
other Saturday and at least four hours on an evening during the off week. 
5. The court finds that Mr. Jefferies has, if not purposely, at least 
subjectively, interfered with visitation by planning competing activities with the children 
on periods of time which were designated for visitation by the children with the Plaintiff, 
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and in that way, subjectively interfered with custody and the relationship between the 
Plaintiff and the children. 
The court also considered the purchase of the vehicle for Nicole which 
encumbered the Defendant in the amount of $400.00 per month, if not outright, at least 
a subtle attempt on his part to adversely influence the children against their mother. 
The court further finds that the Defendant has exercised undue influence 
over the children in order to gain their favor by the purchase of the piano, which was 
entirely inappropriate given the temporary status of this matter, and the fact that the 
child, Nicole, was primarily concerned with the violin during this period of time. It also 
served to divert assets of the marriage. 
6. The Defendant should be enjoined and prohibited from planning 
activities with the children which compete with their visitation with their mother and from 
otherwise interfering with visitation. 
7. The Plaintiff is employed with the Utah State Tax Commission and 
earns an income of approximately $2,246.00 per month and receives $300.00 per month 
from a rental of a room in her home and will also receive approximately $300.00 per 
month interest income from the cash awarded her in this action. 
8. The Defendant is employed with Wasatch Front Regional Council and 
is paid a salary of $72,000.00 annually with a gross income of approximately $6,000.00 
per month. 
9. The court finds that through their employment, both parties may 
maintain health and accident insurance on the children. The court determines that the 
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Defendant should maintain the primary health and accident insurance on the minor 
children subject to that being available through his employment and the parties are to 
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the 
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary 
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical 
expenses. 
10. By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State 
of Utah, the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child 
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support should continue for each 
child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly 
scheduled graduating class. 
11. Both parties were employed prior to the marriage and acquired 
property which they brought into the marriage in the form of savings. The Plaintiff 
brought in $17,000.00 to $18,000.00 into the marriage and these funds were used to 
purchase the home on Elaine Drive and for other family expenses. 
12. Approximately one month prior to the marriage of the parties, 
Defendant purchased a home for $39,200.00. He used $17,000.00 of his premarital 
funds as a down payment on this home. He took title to this property in his name alone. 
The home on 1062 East 2200 South purchased by the Defendant prior to the marriage 
of the parties remained in his name. The mortgage payments and upkeep were paid 
for from marital funds throughout the marriage of the parties. In 1981 this original home 
was sold for $100,420.00 to the "Dones". As part of the purchase price, the Buyers 
4 
conveyed two lots to the Defendant and paid $18,0D. ;" ^ ^ 1 . -uyers also 
-- — • ;-.
 :.- * *• x;-irr:-!^ 318,000.00. Two lots were conveyed to the 
Defendar lamp .or zc , . . • r~ r ~ V °~dO [^ 28 was valued at 
1
 • ^ ~
v
—' m\ sold 
' ^ >* hack to the "Dones" on JUIIIN 3 1982 for $^0,300.00 and subsequently sold Lot 
- . ^ ,29,000 00 on March J, f'UBi! ) 
with interest within one year. There was no evidence produced as to what happened 
with the proceeds of sale of the home in 1981 or the sale of two perspective lots. There 
i.'> no i!Videii(,H 1111 J t ih'L tunds went into any surplus accounts or were traceable to certain 
assets so as to maintain their separate ider itity. 
- i :>f 
certain stock fa mju. j j it , fu.ni i.^i un v l-,.s: v - -as remained intact and in her 
name
 : --.. parties have done nothing wii;,;.•.„,. . : . . . . . ir 
marriage. 
T L r -nrties owr two homes which they pi irchased during their 
JX
 >' • ulpvarrl .Tru1 2267 Elaine Drive in Bountiful, Utah. 
Parties purchased the home on Elaine Drive as an investment in 1974 and used the 
same J - •> - • * ' n 
moved into it. The home at 3730 South B; ard was pur chased in r& a*..1 
w o c , : s nome a: , . . : . • 
voli ii itarily moved from the home on Bountiful Boulevard before this action was filed and 
moved into the home on Elaine Drive. The Plaintiff has continued to reside in the 
5 
Bountiful Boulevard home and the Defendant and two childrei i ii i tt le Elaine Drive home 
II nr HKJIK nil Hit' pel " l ' " ,i I HIM i \ i i |ii'»i«'(« MiliiiiiMi',,, i i i i i i lull I iifi HI | niniiit* lu allcntl l ln i 
schools that they a t ^ n a e j when they l i v ^ J: .:.;_. Boulevard home. 
Il he home on Bounti . = he larger of the two homes.. It has 
a n a pp r a j s e c j v a | u e 0 f $225,000.00 with a m o r t a l s balance of $61,394.00 leaving an 
equity of $163,606.00. 
Ill III!" Ill 111 ( I III III I l l III III. IIIIIII II Il III ' I ' 'i W.T. . IppMISPl I ill "|i I 1 t,l)l)(l l l l l III IS 
subject to a mortgage • ) leaving an equity of $76,120.00. 
,. Ii ii VL y'ell mi i l i \ II In1 I lain I ill II II II nr. i VlHt ' limit iiiij 
t,A 11 ."in I I I I I in v a l i led at $4,10( .;.~ Defendant has a 1986 Olds T^ronado valued at 
$2,900.00 after deducting a sum required to repair certain body dam^n^
 4_ ^c-:endant 
has also purchased a 1991 Subaru Sedan valued at $11,200.00 witi i a loan balance of 
approximately $10,600.00, 
• '"-- isiness 
known as Flying Sta-- - parish have sui -a *iut- ot $55,453 00. 
I hey have also agreed Ni.ii iimi plain,'" sli iiillnJ ln.» avyanleil I  Illiii1 I "lliiiiilill sub|o<,l I in 
obligation ,.
 v ; $15,135.00 leaving a net value on the plane of approximately 
$40,318.00. r ^ " * is also a spare airplane engine worth approximately :_ ...;.• ^ 
parts *TVIL flu^... - 1 W , ( W c IML (Aa^ uo s ^ _ ^ ^ 
; ' l ie course of the marriage, the Defendant has been part of 
pun liri'.i'il intKMi-'st'ii in ii il r'slnli In i n ilninr| he has 
acquired a one-third inter 9.69 acres in Salt Lake County; and an 8.25 percent 
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interest in approximately 26 acres in Salt Lake County; and a one-forth interest in certain 
proppilw Ihii! MI'in ,v, tin- Innliin lli'Hilil". pnippfty HI !i,ill II .iih Pi niiii!1 HIP IMIIH ml! the 
9.69 acres is $68,000.00 and the interest of the Defendant is $22,966.0 j-e value of 
the <ib acfes in yylmJi lin: I JuhMulanl ha;» J I I ti JU puiuutl intuitu,I b 3 
ii..o.wJt of the Defendant ^ $4 141 no,,, The value of the Jordan Heights Partnership 
property is $103,401 ,, ,
 it^ f ondan t ' s one-quarter interest is worth $25,850.00. 
20. I I le court finds the Defendant borrowed some $32,000.00 from the 
Oswald Profit Sharing Plan to repay certain credit lines in connection with the video 
\ i i 11 11 w » " ^  mi in II III i 11 II II i mi mi in i c i l n i l ii i i ) iii i mi in!(f mi in II 1111 III l" 111 ii M M 1 mi 11 i v - i y i " * 3 
Defendant gave a trust deed not secured by the 9 69 acres am jed his interest in 
.JL neights .. 1 lote wa^ n 
the balance of approximately $28,000.00 ow i ry . r educ ing the oaiance ^wH: d o=. i: :e 
note f rom the Defendant 's interest in the h oJ acres and the Jordan Keignib Partnership, 
leaves a net \ »rali 1 = • iiui 1 those properties of approximately $20,816.00. 
21 1 he court finds the Defendant's partners in the land ventures appear 
II I i" r i raHi i i i iod i i l i iH i , ii II II "in "i "i iiinihi II 111111111 I M M 1 II • ; - • n II.HVP the 
same investment and own nei si 1 iip goals as the I hr v >*e the court does not 
discoi ii it till in =!! - a lue • :: "I ' 1:1 lie s< 3 pi opei l ies b e t ^ - st 
therein. Further the court finds these valt ies were established by valuation ft> ore-. - / 
tax purposes The court takes judicial *> .,^ . - jnonal ly these values 
are at least ten percent below fair market value. The coui t f inds any difference in value 
caused by the Defendant 's minority interest is more than offset by the actual value of 
7 
these properties. 
finds he has equitv cA S5 ''00.00 in that condor.;:-*, n. 
First Security Bank with a balance of $10,995.^. «he Plaintiff has used that account 
for her benefit during the pendency of this matter. 
Ill he Plaintiff has ri If) IK Plan \ with ,i value of $12,716.00. 
During the ma:naa- "^45 725 "0 was placed in 
i M . i x . n 111 - > . ( I t 
to Minors Act. The coi.i has determined that those -posits were made v * 
nHant without t;;c ^ .. ...^ ™ , . i 
attempt by the Defendant to hide assets tron. w\<+ , ,«.,,.... and u^*^.^ them to the 
parties' children i inder his control. As such they were fraudulent, not only upon the 
1 ,|
 » i " | i M l|! '"i1 i1 > "|M i M11 iM.intnl estate These transfers are void and the monies are 
considered to be and are ruled to be part of the marital estate. 
Iliiiiili Ihi1 111I11« s uveit1 in iiiiiiii ill Hiiniiiii) » iioutiiiiit III i i- benn sel up 
^ nhildrens' names at Shearson Leh * t,*- accounts have oeen funded 
primarily fi om earnings of the ch* •. . n 
various gifts they have received. A total of $20,448.00 has been paid to Nicole from the 
bi isiness from-1988 - 1992 and there has been a total of approximately $ ^ , b M DO 
period has been paid a| »]:: i = - i t • I) $20,453.00 and ; i\ if: n oximately $23,395.00 has been 
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deposited in his account at Shearson Lehman durng the period. Those sums which 
which the children h:i^ «=- ,ad o v n., :> at period ct imv ;neK- ^ \ iy have been some 
oth'f'ii iiiuidenlkil iiiiiiiiinl1) Ini'li III.i fa hei-.'ii deposited. 
The Defendant withdrew $15,000.00 froi 1 i Nicole's account supposedly in 
conjunction with her in the purchase of the condominium :*is is a matter between the 
Defendant and Nicole. 
A $7,000.00 amou^x "ithdrawn from ton's account in 1991, and a 
III' in in III "i i'"i ttV't pi in' haseci at Dean Wi f^~ '" fron i the 
$7,000,00 withdrawal is Lon's separate property. 
i 
have accumulated a cash value, .h^ Le ^ <* ^ * - ^ -n ,aiuc j f 
$3,399.00. A Per n i Life policy has a cash value of $/UU.UU and a I 'iiricipdl I /lutual policy 
has a cash value of $659.00. 
28. The Plaintiff has a life insurance with Beneficial Life with a cash 
i ; / 5 oo. 
29 1 1 lei e are life insurance policies on the children with accumulated 
i .jsli !/dlutu , I ' "in I I I Ihi piu|MMly nul tint i lliiiliilii IIII 
1 1 te Wasatch Front Regional Council has opted CM it of the social 
security systems, so they have a separate retirement systei i i f :: •i til i€ ii en n iployees Il I! m e 
system provides for retirement by allowing the employees to invest if i a 457 Plan, which 
is administered by the State of I Itah In addition, the Wasatch Front Regional Council 
9 
contributes a matching amount into a separate plan known as the 401(a) which is 
ad ministered by Principle Financial. The retirement plans provide many advantages over 
social security, I Inder the 457 Plan, all funds accumulated are paid to the employee 
"if""fin ffiinih.i'li >n I " 'flicI- »j 'iiiiMil, (h MIII, ill" ihhh i imfniM »MM ^py-Pfp fin.'inml 
emergencies, The recipient, upon retirement can elect a lumo-sum aistnoution, periodic 
I i | <" mi 1 i i i i ill ii mi i mi II a 111 i ill i i MI , ii II II i M I 1, ill i v i " i I I I mi in II i " 1 I I I I l l II ( . i l l i " i 11 i a k i * s a 
contribution 011 ~w..^.. . - employee, however, the employee can also make voluntary 
contributions. The contributions made by the employer are totally vested upon death, 
retirement, or termination. Fhe employee has several options for payout including lump-
sum. Under this Plan any contributions made by the employee may be withdrawn at any 
<"- : ' e 
Intern? r-.enue -^-v -?r either of the Plans, all fun \ -rv.ijpt:- may be 
n - b iyudLiL- >"S 
H,<- ,^-r,*..ww ,o 4w/ . .«,, uiic $222,800.ww ~ VOI^ a) Plan. All sums were 
accumulated during the •^rnage, 
III - Plaintiff has minimal state retirement; having drawn out some 
$30,800.00 in January of r.^bl to apply toward the purchase of the parties'* home. 
*\<>86 the part .* > i.^ness known as the "Video Palace". 
Over ii i in II r i l l ""-1 '" '?, 
were the primary source of the children's savings accounts ... _.. Lehnu _ 
business has been operating for 7 years and has provided income to the parties The 
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assets of the business, in addition to actual videos themselves, consist of certain 
computer equipment, a 1983 Dodge Van, and a hot air balloon. Various experts were 
called to evaluate the business. These valuations ranged from a low of $30,000.00 to 
$35,000.00 to a high of $169,000.00. The method of depreciation is the crucial factor 
in valuation. It has a profound effect on the cash flow for valuation purposes. Too rapid 
a depreciation rate tends to underestimate cash flow and too slow a method, tends to 
over-state it. For obvious reasons, the Plaintiffs experts opted for the slowest 
depreciation rate and the Defendant's were the fastest. The court would find the most 
reasonable depreciation rate would be the one nearer the faster rate allowed by the 
Internal Revenue Service's regulations. The court finds that the fair market^  value 
established by the Defendant's expert of $30,000.00, does not fairly take into 
consideration the history of the business and its performance over time and is more a 
liquidation sale price than the sale price of a going concern. From the evidence the 
court finds a fair market value of the business is approximately $100,000.00. There is 
owing on the business an obligation in the amount of $35,000.00 to First Security Bank. 
The court therefore finds the net value of the business is $65,000.00. 
34. The court does not consider the transaction between the Video 
Palace and Ms. Stein in 1993 to have been an arms length transaction and therefore the 
court has not considered that for valuation purposes. 
35. The court finds that in addition to the monies paid to the children, 
family expenses have been paid from the business and that family expenses for other 
household supplies, food, transportation and entertainment have been subsidized by the 
11 
business. 
36. The court finds that each of the parties had in their possession 
certain furniture and fixtures. The court is unable, based on the evidence, to value these 
items. 
37. The court does find that the parlor grand piano in the Plaintiffs 
possession was purchased with funds given to her by her parents and is thus a gift from 
them. It is not part of the marital estate. 
38. The court finds during the course of the marriage, the Defendant has 
acquired certain tools, equipment, personal property and firearms. 
39. The court finds the parties have incurred debts during the course of 
the marriage, to-wit: a mortgage on each of the homes, a balance due and owing on the 
Video Palace business, a balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing Plan, the 
obligation due on the airplane in the business known as Flying Start, taxes owing on the 
Bountiful Blvd. home, the debts the Defendant has incurred since separation to Zions on 
the piano and car purchased for Nicole. 
40. The court finds neither of these parties will be able to maintain the 
same standard of living that was available while they were residing together. The court 
finds that the Plaintiffs requested expenses are unreasonable regarding, the amount that 
she claimed for tuition when the court sees no real advantage to additional education, 
for entertainment expenses in excess of $100.00 per month, for the children's expenses 
in the amount of $200.00 per month in light of her obligation to pay child support and for 
vacation expenses of $150.00 per month. Taking these into consideration, the court 
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finds the Plaintiff has reasonable expenses of $2,724.00 per month. 
41. The court finds the expenses claimed by the Defendant are 
unreasonable, that food expense for 3 people in excess of $400.00 per month is 
excessive, particularly in light of the court's finding that the cost of food, household 
supplies, transportation and expenses are subsidized to some extent by the Video 
Palace as valid business expenses, the clothing expense, in excess of $100.00 per 
month is also unreasonable, as is a dental and medical expense of $150.00 per month 
where each of the parties carry health and dental insurance. Entertainment expenses 
in excess of $100.00 per month is also unreasonable given the manner in which the 
business expenses are handled. The court further finds the obligation on Nicole's car 
is a voluntary obligation incurred by the Defendant after separation and that any sum for 
Nicole's car in excess of $175.00 per month is excessive, given the circumstances of 
these parties. The court further finds that the deduction of $400.00 per month for a new 
car for the Defendant is also excessive given the circumstances of the parties. The 
court further excludes the payment to Zions Bank for the piano which was purchased 
after the date of separation, the court considers it frivolous. The court further finds that 
a claim of $150.00 per month for allowances for the children is unreasonable in light of 
their history of employment with the business. The mortgage payment claimed by the 
Defendant is in excess to the sum of $483.00 per month (based on the award of the 
property made by the court). Based on the foregoing analysis, the court finds a 
reasonable expense for the Defendant is approximately $4,000.00 per month. 
42. The Plaintiff has a net income of $1,588.00 per month plus $300.00 
13 
from a rental of a room in the home. In addition, she should receive approximately 
$300.00 per month in interest income from funds that the court has determined it will 
award to her. Even with this income, the court has found that she is without sufficient 
funds to meet her reasonable expenses. 
43. The court has determined the Defendant has wages of $6,000.00 per 
month with a net income of $4,500.00 to $4,700.00 per month, not including monies 
which he is able to receive from the business or money that he saves by subsidizing 
family obligations through business expenses. In addition, he will have child support 
from the Plaintiff in the sum of approximately $300.00 per month. 
44. The Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of $20,653.00 based on 
a total of 165 hours attributed by counsel and co-counsel. 
45. The court finds the Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees of 
approximately $30,000.00 based on 319 hours having been contributed by two attorneys 
and two paralegals. Mrs. Jefferies did much of the computations as to the graphs and 
business expenses offered into evidence by the Plaintiff. 
46. The court finds that this case was not extremely complicated, it did 
have certain novel issues as to the retirement and unusual factual issues* regarding the 
family business and its value. However, the court finds that to have spent 319 hours on 
this particular case is unreasonable. The court finds that given the complexity of the 
case, the nature of the issues, the results obtained, that 150 hours is a reasonable 
amount of time to be spent on this case by an attorney who is knowledgeable in the area 
of domestic relations as these two attorneys are. A reasonable attorney's fee would be 
14 
$125.00 per hour. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the 
following 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this 
action. 
2. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the 
other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences the same to become final upon signing 
and entry. 
3. The care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties 
should be awarded to the Defendant as stipulated *by the parties. 
4. The Defendant should be enjoined from planning competing activities 
for the children on dates of scheduled visitation and from otherwise interfering with 
visitation. 
5. Visitation is something that will have to be worked out between the 
Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that the children may not be 
willing to go overnight, the court orders visitation every other Saturday and at least four 
hours on an evening during the off weeks. Subject to the foregoing, the court orders 
standard visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35. 
6. By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of 
Utah, the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child 
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support should continue for each 
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child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly 
scheduled graduating class. Income withholding provision of Utah Code Ann. 62A-11-
401 et seq. shall apply. 
7. The Defendant should maintain primary health insurance for the 
children subject to that being available through his employment. The parties are to 
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the 
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary 
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical 
expenses. 
8. The Plaintiff should be awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard 
subject to the mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,6606.00 
for the reason that the Plaintiff is presently living in the home and the Defendant 
voluntarily removed himself therefrom. Given the disparity of income between the 
parties, it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff could purchase -such a home on her own. 
Further, by allocating this equity to the Plaintiff, it allows the Defendant to retain a 
greater portion of his retirement. 
9. The home of the parties on Elaine Drive should be awarded to the 
Defendant subject to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately 
$76,120.00 for the reason that is where the Defendant and the children have been 
residing since the separation. It appears to meet their needs. Given the Defendant's 
income, he has the capacity to move up if he so desires. 
10. The Plaintiff should be awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of 
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$4,100.00. The Defendant should be awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of 
$2,900.00 and the 1991 Subaru and debt thereon with a net value of $600.00. 
11. The Plaintiff should be awarded the airplane subject to the 
indebtedness thereon in the amount of $15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00. The 
Defendant should be awarded the spare airplane engine. P*tm<£>£ ( / ^ r X ^ T \*^*dJ*L« o^J 
12. The Defendant should be awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and * a 4 ^ 
the one-forth interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the 
amount of $28,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those 
two parcels of $20,816.00. The Defendant should be further awarded the 8.25 percent 
interest in the 26 acres with a net equity of $4,141.00 and the condominium purchased 
subsequent to the separation which has an equity of $5,000.00. 
13. The Plaintiff should be awarded the savings account at First Security 
Bank in its original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit 
of that account during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those 
sums to pay her expenses during that period. 
14. The Plaintiff should be awarded the 401 (K) in the amount of 
$12,716.00. 
15. Each of the parties should be awarded half of the sums in the Dean 
Witter Reynolds account in the amount of $145,725.00 plus any accrued interest and 
dividends. Any income taxes incurred as a result of this division should be born equally 
by the parties. 
16. The Plaintiff should be awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash 
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value of $775.00. 
17. The Defendant should be awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a 
cash value of $3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his 
Principal Mutual policy with a cash value of $659.00. 
18. The Defendant should be awarded the "Video Palace" together with 
the furniture and fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness 
thereon of $35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00. 
19. The court finds that the retirement program of the Defendant in the 
form of a 457 plan and a 401(a) plan are substantially different from social security in 
both the rate of return and the ownership interest which the Defendant has in the plans. 
That ownership interest allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among 
other things allows him to withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may 
choose upon retirement, death or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries. 
All of these benefits are substantially more favorable than the usual social security 
benefits. For that reason, the court does not accord to these retirement benefits the 
same protection as is required the federal law for social security. Therefore, the court 
concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital property and subject to division 
in this proceeding. 
20. The Defendant should be awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the 
amount of $233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff. 
21. The Plaintiff should be awarded $201,000.00 of the 401(a) plan free 
and clear of any claim of the Defendant and any interest or accumulation (including 
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additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided until actual division occurs. These 
should be passed to her by appropriate QDRO which should be entered by the court to 
implement this award after entry of the decree of divorce. The Defendant should be 
awarded $21,800.00 from the 401(a) plan free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff and 
any interest or accumulation (including additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided 
until actual division occurs. 
• 22. The court concludes that the total value of the property previously 
awarded should be approximately equal. 
23. Each of the parties should be awarded those items of personal 
property presently in their possession together with any furniture and fixtures. The court 
finds that they are essentially equal. 
24. Each of the parties should be awarded his or her own personal 
property and possessions. 
25. The Defendant should be awarded his tools, power equipment and 
sporting goods including firearms free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff. 
26. The court orders that the tools and equipment used for yard care and 
maintenance are to be divided equally between the parties. As an exception to the 
court's ruling above, the court orders that Defendant return to the Plaintiff the electric 
garage door opener, hose attachments to the vacuum, one of the computers, a CD 
player and in the event that there is more than one Sega and Nintendo player, one is to 
be returned to the Plaintiff. 
27. The parties are ordered to divide equally any family photographs 
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which they may have acquired during the course of their marriage. 
28. The court considers those items of furniture and fixtures used by the 
children to be the property of the children. 
29. The court considers that the $17,000.00 initially contributed by the 
Plaintiff to the marriage and the $17,000.00 initially invested in the home purchased by 
the Defendant to have become marital property. The funds have been co-mingled and 
as such have lost their identity as separate premarital property. Therefore, the court 
considers them as marital property in the allocation made between the parties herein. 
30. The court finds that stock given to the Plaintiff by her uncle which 
has remained in her name has not been co-mingled and is her sole and separate 
property and not subject to distribution. 
31. The sums in the children's names at Shearson-Lehman and Lon's 
bond are awarded to the children. 
32. The Plaintiff should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt 
due and owing on the home in Bountiful Boulevard, including any taxes and the 
$15,135.00 debt due and owing on the plane and to hold the Defendant harmless 
thereon. 
33. The Defendant should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt 
and obligation due on the home on Elaine Drive, the obligation due and owing on the 
business, the balance of any sums owing on the airplane in excess of $15,135.00, the 
balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan and any other debts or 
obligations incurred during the course of the marriage or which he has incurred 
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subsequent to the day of separation. The Defendant should be ordered to hold the 
Plaintiff harmless thereon. 
34. The court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of additional support to 
meet her monthly expenses. Although, the court finds that the Plaintiff will receive 
certain interest payments from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional 
support in order to meet her monthly expenses. The court concludes that in light of the 
Defendant's income from the Wasatch Front Regional Council, his other investments, 
child support he will be receiving and the benefits incident to the ownership of the 
business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the Plaintiff by way of support. The 
court therefore concludes that the Defendant should be ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the 
sum of $700.00 per month as and for alimony. 
35. The court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this 
matter would be $18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the 
result. The court concludes that the Plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said 
attorney's fees but is without sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial 
invasion of the marital estate given her income. The court finds that the Defendant given 
his superior earnings ability, has the ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he 
does so in the amount of $8,750.00. 
21 
DATED this ^s^day of \ V W - 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY £J PAGE, District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
^ 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this ' ' day of May, 
1994 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to the following individual: 
Rodney R. Parker, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Counsel for Defendant 
mb\DSD\Jefferies.2FOF 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 F ' " 
Telephone (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOOOooo— 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
RUTH ANN JEFFERIES, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WILBUR R. JEFFERIES, 
Defendant 
Civil No. 924701612DA 
Judge: Rodney S. Page 
—oooOOOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came before the court, the Honorable Rodney 
S. Page presiding for trial on the 9th and 10th of December, 1993, and closing argument 
on December 15, 1993. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by counsel, 
David S. Dolowitz. The Defendant was present in person represented by counsel 
Rodney R. Parker. The court after hearing the evidence of the parties and the 
arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of trial 
and reserved for further ruling the issues of property division, alimony and related 
matters. Having considered those matters and being fully advised in the premises, the 
court issued its ruling on the 18th day of February, 1994. The court having heard the 
evidence of the parties, and being fully advised in the premises and having herebefore 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 00251647 
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entered the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. This court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this 
action. 
2. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce from the other 
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same to become final upon signing and 
entry. 
3. Care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties is 
awarded to the Defendant. 
4. The Defendant should be enjoined from planning competing activities 
for the children on dates of scheduled visitation and from otherwise interfering with 
visitation. 
5. Visitation is something that will have to be worked out between the 
Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that the children may not be 
willing to go overnight, the court orders visitation every other Saturday and at least four 
hours on an evening during the off weeks. Subject to the foregoing, the court orders 
standard visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35. 
6. By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of 
Utah, the Plaintiff shall pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child 
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support shall continue for each 
child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly 
scheduled graduating class. Income withholding provision of Utah Code Ann. 62A-11-
2 0025164. 
401 et seq. shall apply. 
7. The Defendant shall maintain primary health insurance for the 
children subject to that being available through his employment. The parties are to 
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the 
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary 
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical 
expenses. 
8. The Plaintiff is awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard subject to 
the mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,606.00 for the reason 
that the Plaintiff is presently living in the home and the Defendant voluntarily removed 
himself therefrom. Given the disparity of income between the parties, it is highly unlikely 
that Plaintiff could purchase such a home on her own. Further, by allocating this equity 
to the Plaintiff, it allows the Defendant to retain a greater portion of his retirement. 
9. The home of the parties on Elaine Drive is awarded to the Defendant 
subject to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately 
$76,120.00 for the reason that is where the Defendant and the children have been 
residing since the separation. It appears to meet their needs. Given the Defendant's 
income, he has the capacity to move up if he so desires. 
10. The Plaintiff is awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of 
$4,100.00. The Defendant is awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of 
$2,900.00 and the 1991 Subaru and debt thereon with a net value of $600.00. 
11. The Plaintiff is awarded the airplane subject to the indebtedness 
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thereon in the amount of $15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00. The Defendant is be 
awarded the spare airplane engine. 
12. The Defendant is awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and the one-
forth interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the amount 
of $28,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those two parcels 
of $20,816.00. The Defendant is further awarded the 8.25 percent interest in the 26 
acres with a net equity of $4,141.00 and the condominium purchased subsequent to the 
separation which has an equity of $5,000.00. 
13. The Plaintiff is awarded the savings account at First Security Bank 
in its original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit of that 
account during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those sums to 
pay her expenses during that period. 
14. The Plaintiff is awarded the 401(K) in the amount of $12,716.00. 
15. Each of the parties is awarded half of the sums in the Dean Witter 
Reynolds account in the amount of $145,725.00 plus any accrued interest and dividends. 
Any income taxes incurred as a result of this division should be born equally by the 
parties. 
16. The Plaintiff is awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash value 
of $775.00. 
17. The Defendant is awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a cash value 
of $3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his Principal Mutual 
policy with a cash value of $659.00. 
00251650 
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18. The Defendant is awarded the "Video Palace" together with the 
furniture and fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness 
thereon of $35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00. 
19. The court finds that the retirement program of the Deienaanx in the 
form of a 457 plan and a 401(a) plan are substantially different from social security in 
both the rate of return and the ownership interest which the Defendant has in the plans. 
That ownership interest allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among 
other things allows him to withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may 
choose upon retirement, death or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries. 
All of these benefits are substantially more favorable than the usual social security 
benefits. For that reason, the court does not accord to these retirement benefits the 
same protection as is required the federal law for social security. Therefore, the court 
concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital property and subject to division 
in this proceeding. 
20. The Defendant is awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the amount 
of $233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff. 
21. The Plaintiff is awarded $201,000.00 of the 401(a) plan free and 
clear of any claim of the Defendant and any interest or accumulation (including additional 
payments) in the ratio this fund is divided until actual division occurs. These should be 
passed to her by appropriate QDRO which should be entered by the court to implement 
this award after entry of the decree of divorce. The Defendant is awarded $21,800.00 
from the 401(a) plan free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff and any interest or 
5 
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accumulation (including additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided until actual 
division occurs. 
22. The court concludes that the total value of the property previously 
awarded should be approximately equal. 
23. Each of the parties is awarded those items of personal property 
presently in their possession together with any furniture and fixtures. The court finds that 
they are essentially equal. 
24. Each of the parties is awarded his or her own personal property and 
possessions. 
25. The Defendant is awarded his tools, power equipment and sporting 
goods including firearms free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff. 
26. The court orders that the tools and equipment used for yard care and 
maintenance are to be divided equally between the parties. As an exception to the 
court's ruling above, the court orders that Defendant return to the Plaintiff the electric 
garage door opener, hose attachments to the vacuum, one of the computers, a CD 
player and in the event that there is more than one Sega and Nintendo player, one is to 
be returned to the Plaintiff. 
27. The parties are ordered to divide equally any family photographs 
which they may have acquired during the course of their marriage. 
28. The court considers those items of furniture and fixtures used by the 
children to be the property of the children. 
29. The court considers that the $17,000.00 initially contributed by the 
00251652 
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Plaintiff to the marriage and the $17,000.00 initially invested in the home purchased by 
the Defendant to have become marital property. The funds have been co-mingled and 
as such have lost their identity as separate premarital property. Therefore, the court 
considers them as marital property in the allocation made between the parties herein. 
30. The court finds that stock given to the Plaintiff by her uncle which 
has remained in her name has not been co-mingled and is her sole and separate 
property and not subject to distribution. 
31. The sums in the children's names at Shearson-Lehman and Lon's 
bond are awarded to the children. 
32. The Plaintiff is ordered to assume and discharge the debt due and 
owing on the home in Bountiful Boulevard, including any taxes and the $15,135.00 debt 
due and owing on the plane and to hold the Defendant harmless thereon. 
33. The Defendant is ordered to assume and discharge the debt and 
obligation due on the home on Elaine Drive, the obligation due and owing on the 
business, the balance of any sums owing on the airplane in excess of $15,135.00, the 
balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan and any other debts or 
obligations incurred during the course of the marriage or which he has incurred 
subsequent to the day of separation. The Defendant is ordered to hold the Plaintiff 
harmless thereon. 
34. The court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of additional support to 
meet her monthly expenses. Although, the court finds that the Plaintiff will receive 
certain interest payments from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional 
00251653 
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support in order to meet her monthly expenses. The court concludes that in light of the 
Defendant's income from the Wasatch Front Regional Council, his other investments, 
child support he will be receiving and the benefits incident to the ownership of the 
business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the Plaintiff by way of support. The 
court therefore concludes that the Defendant is ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $700.00 per month as and for alimony. 
35. The court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this 
matter would be $18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the 
result. The court concludes that the Plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said 
attorney's fees but is without sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial 
invasion of the marital estate given her income. The court finds that the Defendant given 
his superior earnings ability, has the ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he 
does so in the amount of $8,750.00. 
DATED this <2S^day of t Y W , 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
<LL .. JM 
RODNEY Si PAGE, District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
it 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this * I j a y of May, 
1994, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to the following 
individual: 
Rodney R. Parker, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Counsel for Defendant 
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